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‘- Stability of Fundins for the CGIAR 
Purpose of Paoer 
1. A number of center directors have indicated that stability of 
funding is as important to them at the margin as the level of funding they 
actually receive. This paper sets out suggestions for improving the 
stability of funding in 1984 and beyond. The subject will be discussed under 
Agenda Item 9 at the meeting of the Group in Paris, May 25-27. 
Backaround 
2. Support for the CGIAR by the international community continues to 
be strong and to receive high priority within the aid budgets of its 36 donor 
members. The aggregate level of contributions has increased annually but it 
is becoming harder to raise the sums the system needs and can effectively 
utilize. With funding levels under pressure, there has been growing 
uncertainty and instability. Uncertainty is not a new problem for the 
system; in fact it is due in part to the very characteristics that make the 
CGIAR successful, such as informality, voluntarism and flexibility. 
3. The funding mechanism of the CGIAR is characterized by .being annual 
(no long-term commitments), voluntary (no quotas - no obligations), 
decentralized (36 donors of which 34 act independently), and bilateral (36 
donors dealing with 13 centers). Most donor pledges are made six weeks 
before the start of the year in which the funds will be used, thus providing 
the centers with only a very short time to adjust if the pledges vary from 
what was expected. Often the pledges are still subject to approval by the 
nati'onal treasury or parliament. Also, about 40% of the pledges are made in 
non-dollar currencies and the actual amount received in US dollars depends on 
the movement of exchange rates. On the other hand, the CGIAR-supported 
operations are continuing and long-term by nature, and require stability and 
continuity. Last minute adjustments to programs can be made only at the cost 
of continuity and at the risk of waste. Flexibility in adapting programs is 
also limited by the fact that 60% to 70% of the expenditures are for 
personnel services, which are difficult to adjust quickly. 
4. Although this problem is inherent in the CG system, it did not 
begin to have serious consequences until 1979. Earlier it was masked by the 
combined effects of the yearly increase in the number of donors and in the 
size of their individual contributions. By 1979 the CGIAR had already 
attracted most potential donors, and the donors' funds were getting tighter. 
Exchange rate changes and inflation both took a significant toll on the real 
value of contributions particularly in 1981-82. 
5. The system has moved to adjust to this situation. It is now 
accepted that growth in contributions cannot maintain the pace achieved in 
the past. Therefore, TAC has started an in-depth re-examination of 
system-wide research priorities, and of how different levels of funding may 
affect the individual center's mandates and programs. Meanwhile, short-term 
adjustments have been necessary. Programs and budgets are now prepared by 
the centers at different levels of estimated funding in order to preserve 
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flexibility. This approach has allowed the centers to adjust on short 
notice. However, it has had negative effects: reductions tend to be ad hoc 
(i.e. where possible in the short-term rather than where most desirable); in 
some cases programs were cut more than turned out to be necessary. In 
addition some centers have had to put some senior staff on notice to increase 
their flexibility, with the consequent negative impact on staff morale and a 
tendency to lose good younger staff. 
6. While these changes have helped, the centers are still not 
adequately protected against instability arising from such sources as 
fluctuations in exchange rates and higher than expected inflation in host 
countries. Although it has not occurred in the past on a large scale, 
another potential source of instability is shortfalls by one or more donors 
on pledges made formally or informally at the beginning of the year, or major 
unexpected reductions in contribution from one year to the other. It is not 
inconceivable that such uncertainties could increase rather than decrease in 
the years ahead. 
7. Centers operate with one month of working capital and essentially 
no other reserves- When faced with unexpected fluctuations in funding, they 
try to find ad hoc answers, and are often successful. Centers occasionally 
borrow on the commercial market to overcome cash flow problems, but this is a 
limited, short-term remedy, and carries a high cost. With a low reserve 
level and with uncertainty about the actual availability of funds continuing 
until late in the year, the only balancing mechanism affecting the lack, 
rather than the timing, of funding has been the allocation of the World 
Bank's contribution in its role as donor of last resort. A portion of World 
Bank funds are held until late each year so that the final allocation can 
take account, as much as possible, for unexpected problems. The total 
available has been small in relation to the variability in funds actually 
received by the centers. This mechanism is not adequate to eliminate the 
uncertainty which centers face about the real level of resources available 
for them during the year, partly because it is insufficient in size and 
partly because it is disbursed late in the financial year and adds no new 
resources to those on which center budgets were based. Centers do not know 
until late October whether they will receive such funds, which is often too 
late to use them effectively. Sometimes such late funding has to be carried 
forward to the next year, in effect depriving the system of their use in the 
year in which they were budgeted to be spent. 
Establishment of a Stabilization Mechanism 
8. The goal in setting up a stabilization mechanism would be to make 
it possible at the beginning of the year-to give each center a firm funding 
level which it could count on receiving during the year, without regard to 
changes in exchange rates, unexpectedly high inflation, or other unforeseen 
events. This would permit the center to establish a work program based on 
the priorities contained in its program and budget, reviewed by TAC, and 
approved by the Group. It would not be necessary for each center to keep 
flexibility in case of shortfalls, and for example to delay procurement of 
needed commodities or capital items, or the planning of training programs, 
until the funds were actually in hand. The result would be to enhance the 
efficiency of the use of available funds, up to the firm level established at 
the beginning of the year. 
- 
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9. The first step in establishing such a firm level would be the 
customary assessment of pledged and likely contributions made by the CGIAR 
Secretariat following International Centers Week each year. This assessment 
would have to be performed with particular care, and perhaps in a somewhat 
more conservative fashion than in the past, if it is to serve as the basis 
for establishing a firm funding level for each center. Experience in recent 
years has shown that the Secretariat cannot know accurately at that time the 
final contribution level of each donor, even in its own currency, but that 
some of the errors tend to balance out. 
10. Assuming the availability of an adequate reserve for stabilization 
purposes (as described be1 owl, the CGIAR Secretariat would calculate a "firm" 
figure for each center, based on the probable level of contributions, exclud- 
ing the reserve. The firm level would probably be the same percentage for 
all centers above or below the bottom of the bracket established by the CGIAR 
on the recommendation of TAC. If contributions during the year (apart from 
those allocated to the reserve) exceed the firm level, the funds received 
would be used by the centers to increase program activities within the 
framework of their approved programs. The World Bank contribution would 
continue to be used to ensure a good balance of funding among centers, in its 
role as donor of last resort. 
11. If contributions during the year are more than a designated 
percentage (e.g. one percent) below the firm level because of changes in the 
exchange rates of the currencies in which contributions are made, or unex- 
pectedly high rates of inflation in one or more center host countries, or 
other unexpected events such as natural disasters, the reserve funds would be 
used to compensate the centers affected, bringing them up to their firm 
funding levels. (A shortfall less than one percent is not sufficient to 
cause a significant problem. Moreover, we cannot gauge the actual level of 
contributions accurately enough during the year to be able to identify a 
shortfall of less than one percent with certainty.) 
12. One difficult area is that of donor default. There have been cases 
in recent years when a donor did not make timely payment of a pledge because 
of a foreign exchange problem or other unexpected difficulties. The loss of 
funds for this reason is just as much a problem for the centers involved as 
losses from devaluation of donor currencies. As a matter of principle, 
however, it is unlikely that donors to a stabilization reserve would be 
willing to use their funds to make up for a default by another donor. Also, 
the existence of a possible alternative source might relieve the pressure on 
the donor in question to find means of making good on the pledge. Accord- 
ingly, it seems best to rule out donor default as an event which would 
activate the stabilization mechanism. We must recognize, however, that this 
omission reduces the "firmness" of the budget level from the point of view of 
the centers. 
Mechanics of Ooeratina a Stabilization Fund 
13. There are two main ways in which the stabilization mechanism could 
be operated. Both would share the principle that the reserve would be 
carefully guarded, and utilized only when all other means of making up for 
the shortfall had been exhausted. This rule is required by the fact that 
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possible emergencies are numerous and unpredictable in size while the amount 
of funds available for stabilization purposes is at best likely to be small. 
- 
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14. One approach would be to hold back the reserve funds until late in 
the year and then allocate all of the reserve to centers, first to compensate 
for shortfalls caused by unforeseen events, and any balance to raise program 
levels. This would have the advantage of using all funds within the year in 
which they first become available. Any balance not needed for stabilization 
purposes could be allocated in the same way that the late tranches of World 
Bank contributions are now allocated, i.e. to balance the access of the 
centers to funds in relation to their approved budgets. This approach has . 
the disadvantage of possibly providing unexpected and substantial amounts of 
money to centers very late in the year, when they have the alternative of 
spending for the very limited kinds of things that can be bought rapidly, or 
being caught with a large carry-over which then becomes subject to the 
system's rules for allocation in the following year. The result might be to 
frustrate to some extent the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the use 
of funds through longer-term planning based on reliable expectations. 
15. The other approach would be to hold back any part of the reserve 
not needed for the designated stabilization purposes in a given year to 
augment the resources available for stabilization in following years. This 
approach has obvious long-term advantages, and would obviate the problem of 
allocating unexpected funds to centers late in the year. A continuing 
reserve of this kind could be set up in such a way that it could accept 
windfall gains such as occurred at CIMMYT late in 1982, and hold those funds 
until required. On the other hand, it implies withholding from centers funds 
which, if made available early enough in the year, could probably be used for 
current requirements. 
- 
16. In the light of experience so far, a reserve of 5% of total contri- 
butions would meet requirements as set out above in most years, while one of 
10% would provide considerable assurance that stabilization needs would be 
met. One argument for aiming at the higher figure is the possibility that at 
some time in the future one or more substantial donor may find it impossible 
to continue support at previous levels and that others cannot take up the 
slack immediately. In such an event no conceivable stabilization mechanism 
would make it possible to avoid a substantial restructuring of programs 
supported by the CGIAR. But it might be possible to make the necessary 
reductions more efficiently were a sufficient reserve cushion available to 
ease the transition. 
17. It would, of course, be possible to establish a stabilization 
mechanism at any level of funding by setting aside a designated percentage of 
contributions and allowing centers to plan their expenditures at the remain- 
ing level of funding. The desirability of doing so, however, depends very 
much on the aggregate level of funding that is available. It would be 
particularly desirable to establish a stabilization reserve with incremental 
funding designated specifically for that purpose. 
18. Barring a major change in donor intentions, there seems at present 
no likelihood of achieving a 5% reserve -- much less a higher one -- in a 
single year without making damaging program reductions in the short run. No 
- 
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provision of funds for this purpose has been built into our budget planning 
for 1984. If a stabilization mechanism is started in 1984, it might well 
have to begin with a smaller reserve than is ultimately desirable. 
Initiatina a Stabilization Mechanism 
19. The management of the World Bank has been sufficiently impressed by 
the need for some sort of stabilization mechanism to make provision in its 
budget proposals for 1984 to the Executive Board that the percentage of the 
CGIAR total budget provided by the World Bank be increased above its usual 
level of 10% and that the increase be used to establish a stabilization 
mechanism to the extent feasible. The increase involved should be sufficient 
to provide up to Z-l/Z% of the budget level for 1984. 
20. Other donors may wish to consider whether they would be in a 
position to make an incremental contribution to the CGIAR in 1984 which would 
help to establish a stabilization mechanism. Such contributions could be 
made directly to a stabilization reserve. Donors unable to make such direct 
contributions could nevertheless help make room for the establishment of a 
reserve by making incremental contributions for other purposes. 
21. If the Group wishes, it would be possible for the CGIAR Secretariat 
to work with TAC and the centers to prepare a specific proposal for a 
stabilization mechanism to start in 1984 for consideration at International 
Centers Week. The proposal would include recommendations on strategy for 
using the reserve, and indication of possible levels. The actual level of 
the reserve, and indeed whether it will be possible to have one at all, will 
depend on the response of donors to the overall needs of the system for 1984, 
and TAC's judgement about the essential program levels for the centers in 
that year. 
Issues to be Considered 
1. What priority does the Group attach to the establishment of a 
stabilization mechanism? 
2. Should an effort be made to do so in 1984? 
3. What are the prospects of obtaining sufficient funding, particularly 
incremental funding, to make such an effort possible? 
4. What are the specific conditions which should trigger the use of the 
mechanism? 
5. Should the funds set aside be fully allocated at the end of the year 
even if not all were needed for stabilization purposes, or should 
savings be accumulated from year to year? 
